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Institutions and Economic Inequality1 
John Amis, Kamal Munir and Johanna Mair 
INTRODUCTION 
The global rise of economic inequality has become an increasingly prevalent theme in 
the economics and sociology literatures. Much of the focus of this work has been on 
the uncovering of statistical evidence that economic inequality exists, and is increasing. 
A growing body of research, including Atkinson (2015), Dorling (2011, 2014), Jencks 
et al. (1979), Piketty (2014) and Stiglitz (2013), overwhelmingly suggests that overall 
improvements in aggregate wealth are in fact associated with increases in inequality. 
For example, the share of wealth in the United States enjoyed by the top 0.1% grew 
from 7% in 1979 to 22% in 2012 (Saez & Zucman, 2014). In 1965, CEOs of major 
American companies earned 10 or 18 times more than the typical worker, depending 
on the compensation measure; by 2012, it had increased to 202-to-1 or 273-to-1 
respectively (Mishel & Sabadish, 2013). These figures become even more extreme in 
the financial sector. In 2004, for example, the combined income of the top 25 hedge 
fund managers was greater than the combined income of all CEOs of S&P 500 firms 
(Kaplan & Rauh, 2010). Further, of the top 0.1% of income earners, 18.4% worked in 
finance or were executives, managers and supervisors of financial firms (Bakija, Cole, 
& Heim, 2012). 
 2 
The extreme levels of inequality are starkly borne out in the anti-poverty charity 
Oxfam’s (2017) report that the proportion of the world’s wealth owned by the top 1% 
has continued to dramatically increase. In fact, Oxfam (2017) reports that the eight 
wealthiest people in the world own the same amount as the least well off 3.5 billion, or 
50% of the world’s population. When juxtaposed with Oxfam’s (2016) research that 
stated that the wealth of the richest 62 people in the world increased by 44% between 
2010 and 2015 while that of the bottom 3.5 billion fell by 41% over the same period, it 
can be seen that there appears to be an ever-increasing concentration of wealth among 
the richest members of our society. 
If the recent rise in inequality is now well established, what is also increasingly 
recognized is that it appears to have hugely detrimental consequences. Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2010) have demonstrated that higher levels of inequality are correlated with a 
wide variety of undesirable consequences including lower life expectancies, greater 
levels of community dysfunction, greater levels of drug use, more mental health 
problems, poorer physical health, greater obesity rates, increased levels of violence, 
lower levels of educational performance, higher rates of imprisonment and lower levels 
of social mobility. 
Such patterns of inequality seem to perpetuate themselves not just in society in 
general but within organizations too. The ‘working poor’, while ‘seemingly 
indispensable to the value creation model for firms in developed economies’ (Leana, 
Mittal, & Stiehl, 2012: 901), appear to have little chance of advancing beyond their 
current circumstances (see also Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012 for a similar argument 
in developing economies). Further, despite decades of awareness, women remain 
discriminated against in many organizations, leading to a perpetuation of unequal pay 
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and severe under-representation in senior management positions (Belliveau, 2012; 
Ryan & Haslam, 2007). Racial disparities (Carton & Rosette, 2011; Cortina, 2008), 
sexual harassment (Berdahl, 2007; Raver & Gelfand, 2005), discrimination against 
stigmatized and marginalized individuals and groups (Martí & Fernández, 2013; Soule, 
2012) and exploitation that leads to ‘body breakdowns’ (Michel, 2011) have also been 
reported as outcomes of formal and informal policies of exploitation and inequality. 
These patterns of inequality are engendered by deeply entrenched power structures 
that are manifest in institutionalized beliefs and rules that dominate social and economic 
life. These include economic and political ideologies, the class system, gender roles, 
social structures, discourses and subject positions that have themselves reified societal 
inequalities. Mair et al. (2012: 820), for example, provide an evocative analysis of the 
ways in which social inequalities in developing countries are reinforced as market 
access and opportunities are governed by local institutional arrangements that ‘consist 
of complex interlocks of formal institutions, such as constitutions, laws, property rights, 
and governmental regulations, and informal institutions, such as customs, traditions, 
and religious beliefs’. To date, however, the institutional arrangements underpinning, 
and dynamics of, inequality have been largely overlooked (for an exception see Mair, 
Wolf & Seelos, 2016). 
It is this agenda that we take up in our chapter. In doing so, we are responding to 
recent polemics, prescriptions and calls to engage more with substantive societal 
problems (e.g., Seelos & Mair, 2017;  Bapuji, 2015; Dover & Lawrence, 2010; George, 
McGahan, & Prahbu, 2012; Gulati, 2007; Hinings & Greenwood, 2002; Lorsch, 2009; 
Mair & Martí, 2006; Munir, 2011, 2015; Riaz, 2015; Seelos & Mair, 2007; Starkey & 
Madan, 2001; Von Glinow, 2005). We believe that the potential for institutional 
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scholars to inform understanding of the mechanisms that exacerbate or reduce 
inequality is significant; similarly, the study of inequality poses fundamental questions 
for institutional theory. 
The problem of increasing inequality appears to stem, at least in part, from the 
growing disparity between stagnating wages of lower-level employees on the one hand 
and rapid wealth accumulation by the rich on the other (e.g., Lansley, 2012; Piketty, 
2014; Stiglitz, 2013). This in turn has been causally linked to two related phenomena, 
the first of which is the influence of corporations. Barley (2007) argued that many 
corporations wield inordinate influence over policy-making, hamper the performance 
of institutions created to protect the public from corporate excesses and, together with 
various multilateral institutions, push for increased privatization of public services. One 
example of a firm that is arguably intent on increasing its influence on public policy in 
the United States and Europe is Google. Concerns have been raised, on the one hand, 
about the firm’s strategy of recruiting former government insiders, and, on the other, of 
how several former Google employees have been recuited to fill prominent political 
positions (Doward, 2016). While Barley (2007) particularly emphasizes the effects of 
large corporations, Davis (2016) argues that in fact an economy dominated by a number 
of large corporations has been replaced by the so-called ‘gig economy’, with an 
emphasis on flexible work produced by self-employed contractors. However, these 
organizations designed to be more responsive to environmental changes also have the 
potential to increase disparities between those in professional or senior leadership 
positions, and those reliant on short-term, temporary and non-guaranteed contracts. 
Thus, whether large, traditional employers, or technology-intensive firms intent on 
constructing highly flexible workforces, corporations, in varied ways, are employing 
strategies that are apparently increasing levels of inequality. 
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The second antecedent for the increasing prevalence of inequality has been the 
financialization of the economy (Davis, 2009; Lansley, 2012; Stiglitz, 2013). 
Precipitated most notably by the emphasis on deregulation of the financial industry in 
the 1980s by the governments of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in 
the United States, financial institutions became characterized by the aggressive pursuit 
of short-term policies aimed at increasing wealth maximization. Such an approach, 
inevitably, spilled over into other industries such that shareholder return has become, 
in many cases, the sole driver of corporate strategies. As Burgin (2012: 214) 
documented, ‘the rise of deregulation in the 1970s and the subsequent election of 
Ronald Reagan had ushered in nearly thirty years during which the primacy of free 
markets was largely assumed’. Chang (2011) is among those who have pointed to the 
ways in which such a philosophy is explicitly oriented to have a positive impact on 
minority shareholders and senior managers at the expense of lower-level employees 
and long-term corporate well-being. In this environment, imperatives such as 
employment conditions, economic mobility and employee benefits are consistently 
overlooked (Stout, 2012). 
In the context of these observations, our purpose in this chapter is to open up 
possibilities for developing institutional explanations for the persistence of inequality. 
We believe this will lead to a more holistic understanding of the causes of inequality, 
and in turn a more robust conceptualization of possible prescriptions. To this end, we 
draw upon four different streams of work to provide a conceptual framework for an 
institutional understanding of inequality. Our intent is not to provide detailed theoretical 
expositions of each stream – these are carried out in detail elsewhere in this book – but 
rather to uncover the ways in which an institutional infrastructure has emerged to create 
a society in which inequality is widely seen as inevitable. The four perspectives are 
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selected, and ordered, to cumulatively build a detailed understanding of how 
institutions and inequality are inextricably interlinked. We begin by examining the 
institutional microfoundations of inequality. Our focus here is on uncovering the ways 
in which inequality becomes reified in everyday actions and interactions by and among 
individuals. We build out from a focus on individuals to consider how the discourse 
that people produce structures social life and in so doing creates a context in which 
systems of inequality can flourish but can also be potentially challenged. The third 
section focuses upon institutional logics, the material and symbolic constructions 
underpinned by a shared set of values, norms and assumptions that help determine what 
are considered to be appropriate, and inappropriate, courses of action. In so doing, the 
taken-for-granted social structures that have resulted in inequality are investigated. This 
allows us, in our final section, to examine the role of identity in the creation and 
maintenance of inequality. Implicated here are the ways in which social constructions 
such as gender, class, race, disability and status create expectations of how we and 
others should behave in particular situations. In adopting this structure, we show how 
four of the most dominant perspectives in institutional theory are mutually interlinked 
to create an environment in which inequality has become a taken-for-granted feature of 
everyday life, and how those institutions that underpin inequality might be reframed. 
THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right 
and when they are wrong are more powerful than is commonly understood. 
Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves 
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves of some 
defunct economist. (Keynes, 1936: 383) 
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An important consideration for those interested in the perpetuation of inequality is how 
the dynamics of everyday life in organizational and field settings can reify and 
institutionalize particular social structures. Resonating with efforts to attend to the 
microfoundations of institutions and institutional processes (e.g., see Barley, Chapter 
13 this volume; Powell & Rerup, Chapter 12 this volume), this is a broader theoretical 
concern at the forefront of institutional scholarship and one that we consider here. In 
particular, we first investigate the ways in which inequality is experienced and 
reinforced from repeated, often mundane, everyday organizational practices. Second, 
we assess the ways in which practices that lead to, and accentuate, inequality spread 
within and across institutional fields. 
Reproducing Practices of Inequality 
Understanding how practices become institutionalized has long been at the heart of 
institutional theory. However, as Martí and Mair (2009: 98) explained in their 
discussion of the perpetuation of poverty, ‘there is a need to unpack the institutional 
forces that make policies so persistent and to understand how to act upon them … 
Studying how the wide array of legacy institutions, traditions, myths and customary 
practices that underlie policy are reproduced and maintained, and by whom, is of utmost 
importance.’ Understanding how such ‘institutions, traditions, myths, and customary 
practices’ are constructed and reproduced will, we contend, provide insight into the 
escalation and perpetuation of inequality. 
Institutions are produced, and reproduced, through the situated, everyday activities 
of individuals. Members of organizations ascribe meaning to actions and, in so doing, 
develop taken-for-granted understandings (Powell & Rerup, Chapter 12 this volume). 
Thus, when becoming institutionalized, practices that would otherwise be considered 
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quite banal and unremarkable are imbued with a meaning informed by broader cultural 
beliefs (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Powell 
and Covylas (2008) suggested that insights from ethnomethodology, sense-making, 
interaction rituals, performativity and status expectations can help us understand how 
this process takes place. In each case, they argue, we gain exposure to the sequences of 
individual actions and decisions that constitute the building blocks of microfoundations 
of institutions and institutional processes. We argue that the unveiling of the 
microfoundations underpinning inequality would have great utility in helping us 
understand the ways in which inequality becomes established and subsequently 
reproduced, and how they might also be unpicked. For example, in contrast to the 
popular image of processes underpinning institutional change as muscular, radical or 
triggered by external jolts, Mair and Hehenberger (2014) provide insight into the 
mundane and gradual processes that became rationalized and taken-for-granted as 
strategies to alleviate poverty and fight inequality. In particular, they show the 
importance of collective action by dissimilar actors in bringing about change, but also 
demonstrate how such action is only possible by reframing constituents’ practices in 
such a way that neutralizes opposition from groups with disparate interests. 
Further insight into the microfoundations of inequality can be gained by examining 
the ways in which changes to the socioeconomic environment in which firms operate 
has led to a change in the structure of workforces in many firms. At the operational 
level, firms have engaged in strategies that have led to the outsourcing of 
manufacturing, the employment of staff on temporary rather than full-time contracts, 
and the general stagnation of wages. By contrast, senior and chief executives have seen 
their wages and bonuses climb, particularly in the United States (Stiglitz, 2013). On the 
one hand, such steps can be seen as straightforward responses to competitive pressures. 
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However, as such practices are repeated within and across organizations, are permeated 
by interlocking boards, become reinforced by complementary practices, are reported on 
by the media, become topics of conversation inside and outside organizations, and so 
on, they become constituted within a broader cultural understanding of what is 
considered normal, and become meaningful. In other words, practices take on a 
symbolic value of being representative of good management practice. In fact, not 
following such practices is seen as unusual, even bizarre. A good illustration of the way 
in which new micro-practices became institutionalized and had a major impact on 
inequality is provided by the recent financial crisis. Ray Perman’s (2013) book on the 
rise and fall of the Bank of Scotland in the UK is beautifully illustrative in this regard. 
The Bank of Scotland 
Perman (2013) starts out by pointing out how banks have traditionally been highly 
conservative organizations that ascribed to the maxim ‘lend short and borrow long’. In 
other words, capital to be borrowed by a bank should be on terms that allow repayment 
over a relatively long period, while money should be lent only over short timeframes. 
The principle underlying this was that any bank that fails to maintain its liquidity is 
extremely vulnerable. Of course, such a value proposition mitigates against practices 
such as mortgage lending in which lent capital is typically tied up for periods of up to, 
and beyond, 25 years. Following the deregulation of financial services in 1986, the UK 
financial industry fundamentally changed. Among other things, building societies, the 
traditional mortgage lenders, saw opportunities to engage in the provision of other 
financial services that had been the preserve of banks. By contrast, leaders of banks 
also began to look at how they might expand their services, and began to view 
mortgages and other forms of lending as potentially lucrative. In 1995, the Bank of 
Scotland celebrated its tercentenary, an occasion marked by the Financial Times calling 
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it ‘the most boring bank in Scotland’, something that it noted had allowed it to enjoy 
300 years of consistent profitability and to ‘outperform the sector by nearly 100 per 
cent since 1980’ (quoted in Perman, 2013: 50). A series of decisions illustrates how the 
bank’s operating values subsequently changed, to disastrous effect. 
In 2001 the Bank of Scotland merged with the Halifax Building Society to create 
HBOS. Rather than slow, organic ‘boring’ growth, this marked a strategy of aggressive 
expansion in an attempt to compete with the ‘big four’ banks in the UK: HSBC, Lloyds, 
Barclays and the Royal Bank of Scotland. James Crosby, the new CEO, instructed his 
staff to pursue rapid growth in each of their main market areas. To achieve this, the 
previous conservatism was replaced by a much greater tolerance for risk. Lending 
standards were relaxed, with decisions taken to offer unsecured personal loans, 
increased credit card lending and high-risk ‘specialist’ mortgages – including self-
certified, buy-to-let and 125 per cent mortgages. In fact, to achieve sales targets, it was 
common practice – at HBOS and elsewhere – for bank staff to help potential mortgage 
customers lie on their applications about their income levels in order to secure bigger 
loans. 
Another action that further entrenched the new way of banking was the appointment 
in June 2005 of a new Chief Operating Officer (COO). Rather than banking stalwart 
George Mitchell, the bank appointed Andy Hornby, a 38-year-old with limited banking 
experience, as COO and heir apparent to Crosby. Hornby had brought with him to 
HBOS the sales approach he had developed during his retailing experience with grocery 
chain Asda. Among other things, he was (in)famous for his monthly staff newsletter, 
which always ended with the instruction to ‘Keep smiling, keep selling’. To further 
improve market share, prices on new products were cut (unsustainably) wafer thin as 
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the bank pursued market share at any price. Those staff at the bank who tried to instill 
a more cautious approach were fired, actions that were as much symbolic as 
instrumental in the further reification of the new values. Despite the looming recession, 
and increasing numbers of bank customers suffering financial hardships, bank 
employees were still expected to hit their sales targets primarily by selling new products 
to existing customers; in some cases, the already difficult-to-hit targets were increased 
for retail staff. 
In retrospect, the constellation of actions described above served as 
microfoundations for institutional change in the banking industry. While at one level, 
each of the changes in practice could be considered a response to competitive market 
forces, we can see clear institutional drivers and effects. There were pronounced 
changes to the values that had guided banking practices, from a conservative attitude to 
lending allied with careful organic growth, to a very aggressive pursuit of profits and 
desire for rapid growth in market share. This value change – unsurprisingly – was 
accompanied with shifts in norms of behavior and assumptions about how a modern 
bank should act. Further, these changes went almost entirely unchallenged. Chang 
(2011: 4) explains that the ‘free market’ is anything but free. Rather practices are 
underpinned by expectations, understandings and rules of engagement that are 
established and reified. ‘We accept the legitimacy of certain regulations so totally that 
we don’t see them. More carefully examined, markets are revealed to be propped up by 
rules – and many of them.’ While some of these ‘rules’ were codified in legislative 
changes, others emerged from the day-to-day practices that become accepted and taken-
for-granted as appropriate ways of acting. 
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If HBOS had been the only bank to embrace this new ideology of capital 
accumulation, then its impact on the economy might have been relatively minor. 
However, the new approach to banking had spread like a contagion across the industry. 
The upshot was a failure in the banking system from Iceland to Ireland, the US to the 
UK, eventually leading to a worldwide financial collapse. 
This collective outcome was not a direct result of market liberalization policies. It 
was mediated and made possible by rituals, subcultures and identities that emerged to 
make it all intelligible and indeed desirable to the participants. Those in the financial 
industries were lauded, particularly investment bankers who regarded themselves as 
Masters of the Universe, occupying the commanding heights of the economy. Their 
identities were reinforced by their military-like intense socialization in a ‘white collar 
sweatshop’, convincing them that they were the smartest, and hardest-working, young 
people in society who deserved every ounce of success that came their way (Ho, 2009). 
In her brilliant ethnography of Wall Street, Ho (2009: 152) described how the concept 
of shareholder value became ‘decontextualized, naturalized and globalized’ by 
institutional actors, particularly economists. ‘Reckless expediency’ and shifting risk on 
to other people became an institutionalized practice on Wall Street. Any talk of 
‘redistribution’ of the massive amounts of wealth being generated was openly derided 
and derogatively labeled as being socialist. 
As the financial crisis played out, the effects of decisions made in banks such as 
HBOS became apparent. In a very sobering manner, the financial crisis illustrated how 
seemingly isolated decisions made in response to a perceived business pressure or 
opportunity can become exponentially magnified as new practices become 
institutionalized. The emergence of these new practices, of course, did not take place 
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in a vacuum, but in a culture in which, particularly in the UK and the US, people had 
been encouraged from 1980 on to buy shares, borrow money to purchase houses that 
were almost unaffordable, and pursue wealth-generating opportunities. This was a 
socioeconomic environment in which greed was not seen as problematic, and in which 
the financial industry was lauded as traditional industries, such as manufacturing and 
mining, declined (Collins, 2007; Dobbin & Zorn, 2005; Thompson, 2007). The shifts 
in banking practice ultimately resulted in hundreds of thousands of people losing their 
jobs as banks struggled to survive, loans were called in, and lines of credit for business 
closed; thousands more defaulted on their mortgages and lost their homes. Many of 
those remaining lower-level employees who did retain their jobs in the banking industry 
were given pay cuts. Following the worst of the crisis, executive pay quickly rebounded 
in banking, and in other sectors; share prices also recovered to exceed their pre-2008 
highs (Dorling, 2014). Thus, those with senior positions, who could afford to retain 
their shares, regained most if not all of their losses; those at the lower end, who lost 
jobs, homes and earning power over an extended period, will likely never recover in 
the same way (Stiglitz, 2013). Thus, the financial gap has been extended by changes at 
both ends of the spectrum. 
The Institutionalization of New Practices 
As the types of new practices and processes that we lay out above become repeated and 
gradually adopted across a field, there is a ‘typification of habitualized action’ (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1967: 54) that leads to practices gaining legitimacy and becoming 
institutionalized. There are several, mutually reinforcing, mechanisms through which 
this happens, and that generally distinguish between those actions that are 
institutionalized and those that are not. First, those in positions of power usually feel 
that it is in their best interest to maintain the inequity and thus utilize their bases of 
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power to ensure that systems are established to protect their position. Thus, some 
practices are encouraged and reinforced, while others are condemned and curtailed. 
While work on power in the establishment and development of institutionalized 
practices is relatively limited (Munir, 2015; Willmott, 2015), Lawrence (2008; see also 
Lawrence & Buchanan, Chapter 18 this volume) is among the few who has theorized 
how episodic and systemic forms of power are utilized to establish particular 
institutional practices. 
Second, while those in power can take decisions of the type we saw at HBOS that 
can create what become microfoundations of new institutionalized practices, 
institutions rely on the wider repetition of actions for their reproduction (Barley, 
Chapter 13 this volume; Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Powell & Rerup, Chapter 12 this 
volume). Thus, it becomes apparent that institutionalization is dependent on the situated 
actions of those at all levels of society. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 215) termed this 
‘institutional work – the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at 
creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions’. For example, Dacin, Munir and 
Tracey (2010: 1406) described how social class structures are perpetuated, at least in 
part, by ritualized formal dining practices at Cambridge University. These practices are 
maintained in part by the institutional work carried out by staff ‘performing a role akin 
to that of servants during England’s Victorian era’. A student in the study recalled an 
example of this: ‘At our first formal [dinner], a couple of people got up to go out and 
have a cigarette in between the courses and the sort of the head waiter came up to them 
and said loudly, “You are not peasants! Getting up and smoking in between meals is 
for peasants!” That incident has just stuck in my mind.’ Such repeated micro-activity 
helps to maintain a system of inequality that, in societal terms at least, often 
disadvantages those who are reinforcing it. As Willmott (2015) pointed out, even 
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relatively mundane forms of oppression can become institutionalized in ordinary work 
situations. 
The role of day-to-day practices in organizations in maintaining particular courses 
of action leads to our third point that the ways in which organizations are structured can 
ensure that hierarchical divisions are reinforced and taken-for-granted. In this way, not 
only do organizational practices that promote inequality become reified through the 
establishment of ritual and repetition, but those who are disadvantaged often see no way 
to challenge the accepted orthodoxy and, as we see above, often actively participate in 
the practice reproduction. Gray and Kish-Gephart (2013) described the processes that 
lead to this as a particular form of institutional work that they term ‘class work’. 
Drawing on Goffman (1967), they define class work as the interpretive processes and 
interaction rituals that organization members individually and collectively engage in to 
conform to ‘class rules’ and reinforce class distinctions. As they explain, ‘one’s social 
class and attendant behavior is not simply a function of one’s self-construed social class 
but is also constructed and reinforced (often unconsciously) through routines and 
practices that perpetuate inequality … Class work constructs and legitimates 
organizational norms and routines as appropriate and expected behavior … In this way, 
inequities become institutionalized and maintained over time’ (Gray & Kish-Gephart, 
2013: 672). A significant component of this reinforcement of unequal status comes 
from those who self-ascribe to a lower social class feeling threatened, and even 
stigmatized. According to Eitzen and Smith (2003), this in turn can lead to feelings of 
shame, humiliation and self-blame for their position, and ‘a constant fear of never 
having “got it right”’ (Skeggs, 1997: 6). In sum, many of those in the upper and lower 
classes see their positions as inevitable outcomes of inherent characteristics: the upper 
class have no desire to alter the status quo, the lower class lack the means to do so. This 
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underpins Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2010) analysis of why inequality is so pernicious 
in its societal outcomes. 
While these mechanisms remain under-examined in the institutional literature, they 
are central to our understanding of how inequality becomes established in often 
seemingly mundane organizational practices. Equally important is how these practices 
spread from one organization, and field, to another. It is to this that we now turn. 
Disseminating Practices of Inequality 
Barley (2007), building on the arguments that he espoused over a decade earlier (Stern 
& Barley, 1996), contended that while we have attended to the ways in which society 
influences organizations, we have paid much less attention to how organizations enact 
the world around them and shape society. Of course, this entire chapter explores this in 
one way or another, but it is an observation that is particularly apposite when we think 
about how particular institutional microfoundations serve as platforms for enacting new 
mechanisms for the production and perpetuation of inequality. As the financial crisis 
illustrated, individual actions can quickly spread across institutional fields, and from 
one field to another. For this to happen, as Zucker (1977: 728) explained, actions must 
be perceived as being objective and exterior: ‘Acts are objective when they are 
potentially repeatable by other actors without changing the common understanding of 
the act, while acts are exterior when the subjective understanding of acts is 
reconstructed as intersubjective.’ A key component to this is the process of theorization 
whereby a particular practice is seen as being a legitimate solution to a particular 
organizational failing (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Strang & Meyer, 1993). 
Thus, a decision at the Bank of Scotland to shift from being conservative guardians of 
people’s money to aggressive purveyors of a range of banking services is constructed 
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as a rational act with moral and pragmatic legitimacy. This is because other banks 
confronted with similar circumstances are carrying out similar activities, and in so 
doing establishing perceived economies for their organizations and greater returns for 
shareholders. In this process, ‘the objectivity of institutional arrangements “hardens” as 
individuals internalize these objective social realities, take them for granted and 
recreate them in their ongoing interactions’ (Dolfsma & Verbürg, 2008: 1036). 
While earlier institutional accounts failed to problematize the diffusion of practices 
across a field, with their attendant micro-processes and issues of power and politics 
(Zilber, 2008), it has since been established that ideas are not passively transmitted from 
one organization to another. Rather, the concepts of theorization and translation 
(Czarniawska & Sevon, 1996; Zilber, 2006; Wedlin & Sahlin, Chapter 4 this volume) 
established the idea that practices are adapted to suit local circumstances. In particular, 
practices established in one context are never fully understood, and thus the gaps in 
understanding lead to interpretations – translations – based on the meanings that are 
attributed to particular aspects of the practice and how they might fit in a different 
organizational context (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Wedlin & 
Sahlin, Chapter 4 this volume). Importantly, this process is intentional rather than 
accidental, and collective in that there is broad agreement or acceptance in how the 
practice is to be adopted (Gondo & Amis, 2013; Searle, 2005). Thus, new practices are 
not ‘imprinted literally’ into organizations or professions by external parties, such as a 
government, regulator, or other dominant organization, but are rather interpreted and 
enacted by those within an organization (Dunn & Jones, 2010). For example, the 
adoption of more risky banking practices, while broadly accepted, was interpreted and 
enacted differently in different banks. Thus, some banks emphasized different products, 
or developed different loan application processes, but were still hit with common 
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catastrophic effects (Martin, 2013; Perman, 2013). The acceptance of particular power 
structures, large CEO salaries, part-time contracts for lower-skilled workers, and sub-
contracting of manufacturing to overseas factories, takes place at the field level where 
practices are theorized as viable solutions to common problems: local translation takes 
place within organizations to make the solution contextually specific. As Powell and 
Colyvas (2008: 285) explained: 
micro-level consensus is generated through a process in which values and 
beliefs from the larger society are pulled down into local circumstances, 
creating differential expectations about the performance of individuals in task 
groups. These expectations can become taken-for-granted features of 
organizations, and persist even if they are unjust or unproductive, thus giving 
them an ‘objective’ quality. 
However, as Meyer and Höllerer (2010) have pointed out, selection options are limited 
by the situation in which the action is to occur. Thus, for our purposes, actions that 
increase inequality have become in many cases seemingly inevitable outcomes derived 
from the perceived scarcity of ‘legitimate’ policies of banks, large corporations and 
governments. Those who rail for change – the ‘Occupy’ movements, living wage 
proponents, those who argue for wealth distribution from more progressive taxation 
regimes – find themselves marginalized: while they may attract sympathy from (some) 
decision-makers, the actions they propose are usually seen as not viable in the construed 
value frameworks in which they would have to be implemented. In order to be seen as 
having utility, therefore, problems within the field normally need to be reframed in 
some way, as we saw, for example, with the Arab Spring; however, such reframing is 
exceptional. 
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Our intent in this section has been to show the interplay between activities at the 
individual, organizational and field levels. While practices rules, norms and values are 
transmitted through fields, they are initially constructed, and then subsequently 
translated, by individuals in organizations. It is at the organizational level that policies 
and actions that perpetuate inequality are enacted, often resulting in income levels 
becoming stratified (see, e.g., Cobb, 2016), and wealth accumulating in a small 
proportion of the population (Chang, 2011; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013). We have 
demonstrated the ways in which everyday activities can become reified, sometimes 
quite rapidly in the case of the banking industry, and how these can create an 
interlocking system of structures, systems, values and norms of behavior in which 
increased inequality becomes an almost inevitable outcome. Aligned to these activities, 
of course, are the modes of language and other communicative practices that individuals 
use that help to coordinate social activities. We assess the influence of such discursive 
devices in the next section. 
DISCOURSE AND INEQUALITY 
In a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, characterise, and constitute the social 
body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, 
consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, 
circulation, and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise 
of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates 
through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the 
production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except 
through the production of truth. (Foucault, 1980: 93–94) 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class 
which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its 
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disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, 
so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of 
mental production are subject to it. (Marx & Engels, 1970 [1932]: 64) 
Inequality is different from winning or losing in a race, although that is how it is often 
portrayed. Rather, inequality is a long-term condition, and its continued existence 
necessarily means domination of some groups over others. Given the problematic 
nature of visible privilege or domination, which can lead to rebellion or resistance by 
the oppressed, it is not surprising that the continuation of inequality needs continuous 
legitimation. This is made possible by an interrelated system of discourses that 
collectively serve to justify a particular social order (Fairclough, 2010; Fallon, 2006; 
Van Dijk, 1994). Indeed, over centuries, discourse has played a central role in 
institutionalizing inequality. Previously, we mentioned the unprecedented 
concentration of wealth in the world and the fact that inequality has been increasing 
rapidly. Why have people not resisted it? How have they come to accept their inferior 
status? 
Our hierarchical societies are not maintained by brute force. Although physical force 
is often necessary in establishing a social structure, the everyday maintenance of the 
institutional order is carried out principally through the establishment of a belief system 
that bestows moral and pragmatic legitimacy upon it. In other words, those in inferior 
positions must somehow be made to accept their fate. Thus, surveys show that while 
American class mobility has diminished greatly over the years, especially in 
comparison to Western Europe, faith in the American Dream continues to exist. As 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) suggest, if one wants to live the American Dream, one 
should move to Denmark or Finland. Still, discourses based on rags-to-riches stories of 
billionaires and celebrities, who through their vision or never-say-die attitude attain 
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heights that are supposedly within the grasp of everyone if only they tried hard enough, 
go a long way towards sustaining and perpetuating this myth. 
The same discourses serve to legitimize the exponential growth in CEO salaries 
reported at the opening of the chapter. The myth of meritocracy, springing once again 
from a willingness to work hard, intelligence and the courage to take risks, provides 
crucial support to our acceptance of stark inequality in income. Similarly, gender 
inequality manifest in differing pay for men and women is able to continue because we 
believe that men are clearly able to do things women cannot, and that if the ‘value-
neutral’ institution of the market pays men more, they must deserve it. Before we 
describe how the production and dominance of various discourses has been 
instrumental in the creation and perpetuation of inequality, we briefly examine the rise 
in attention paid to discourse analysis within institutional theory. 
Institutionalism and Discourse 
With discourse central to the creation and persistence of particular social orders, the use 
of discourse analysis has increased among institutional theorists (Hardy & Maguire, 
2010; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Phillips & Oswick, 
2012; Phillips & Malhotra, Chapter 15 this volume). This is, of course, unsurprising 
given that the roots of institutionalism lie in social constructivism (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967), a perspective that privileges discourses as building blocks of social life and 
suggests that perhaps the best method to deconstruct institutional formation is discourse 
analysis. In fact, Phillips et al. (2004) claim that institutions are constructed primarily 
through the production of texts. Texts include written documents, speech acts, pictures 
and symbols (Grant, Keenoy, & Oswick, 1998; Taylor & Van Every, 2000) and 
combine symbolic and material elements. 
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For example, the institutional process of theorization, referred to in the previous 
section, could be seen as a process in which texts are produced that collectively form 
discourses which in turn render particular institutional arrangements sensible, 
meaningful and legitimate. The HBOS example above provides a good example of this 
as the new approach to creating, promoting and selling financial products was 
imbricated in an array of electronic, printed, audio and video materials that were 
circulated to staff and customers. Similarly, in their study of popular photography, 
Munir and Phillips (2005) described how institutional entrepreneurship was in fact a 
discursive process rooted in the production of texts, which constituted new objects, 
concepts and subject positions that changed the dynamics of the institutional field. More 
recently, Khaire and Wadhwani (2010) used organizational discourse analysis to 
investigate the production of a new category in the global market for art. Discourse 
analysis thus provides an epistemological foundation and a methodological approach 
for exploring the processes of social construction that privilege certain discourses and 
social groups over others, thereby continuously legitimizing particular institutionalized 
practices. We now briefly describe how various discourses are produced and go on to 
examine their role in institutionalizing inequality. 
Discursive Legitimization of Inequality 
As mentioned above, sustained domination requires continuous legitimation for which 
the production and acceptance of texts is essential. An interesting example is that of 
British rule in India, which was underpinned by discourses that privileged everything 
that the colonial masters stood for and convinced the natives of their inferiority (Said, 
1977). One example of such a text is the English Education Act of 1835. The Act took 
away support from indigenous curricula and educational institutions and reallocated it 
to Western curriculum, with English as the medium of instruction. As Cutts (1953) has 
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pointed out, this Act was the result of long discussions, which are most famous for the 
memorandum produced by Thomas Macaulay, a historian and high-ranking member of 
the British government, in February 1835. The memorandum, known as Macaulay’s 
Minute, laid the basis for an educational policy whose effects can be seen even today. 
Cutts (1953) reported that, in his Minute, Macaulay stated, ‘I have conversed both here 
and at home with men distinguished by their proficiency in the Eastern tongues. ... I 
have never found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of a good 
European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.’ 
Macaulay argued that the need of the hour was to produce in India, ‘a class of 
persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in 
intellect’. Such arguments were decisive in the adoption of this policy in India and in 
completely transforming the educational system of the vast country to one that affirmed 
Western supremacy and established the useless nature of locally produced knowledge. 
The dismantling of the traditional schooling system and the privileged position of 
the English language and Western knowledge provided the bedrock on which a new 
stratification of India took place, helping to ensure continuous deference by Indians to 
their Western rulers. The durability of such structures depends on the success with 
which imperialist discourses are diffused and internalized (Bhabha, 2004; Said, 1977). 
The effect of such discourses is to sustain a ‘regime of truth’ such that a particular 
‘object of discourse’, or social objectivity, is effectively institutionalized (Foucault, 
1977). 
Religious discourses have also played a significant role in justifying sustained 
inequalities and the legitimization of particular social orders (Berger, 1967). While 
various religious movements have, over the years, undoubtedly led to more egalitarian 
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social orders, they have also been used to legitimize highly unequal relations and 
institutions by ‘bestowing upon them an ultimately valid ontological status, that is, by 
locating them within a sacred and cosmic frame of reference’ (Berger, 1967: 33). 
To take another example from India, a religious stratification was juxtaposed on 
society pinning down each individual’s place in the social order depending on their 
social category, or caste. Conveniently, this social stratification placed the powerful on 
top, and precluded the weak from ever rising to the higher castes. Moreover, the concept 
of karma justified one’s plight in terms of deeds in a past life. Good karma could only 
be accumulated through obedience and acceptance of the existing social order. This 
process is not confined to India of course. A similar process took place in the West 
where, when Catholicism was seen to provide inadequate justification for capitalism, 
Protestantism, much friendlier towards private property and the social divides that 
markets created, was ushered in (Wisman & Smith, 2011). Such forms of analysis have 
been taken on by Mair et al,  (2016), who highlight the importance of religious texts in 
explaining the difficulty in overcoming deeply entrenched social practices such as open 
defecation that reify patterns of inequality in rural India. 
We can also trace the role of discourse in the perpetuation of racial and gender-based 
inequality. The legacy left behind by the institution of slavery and historical power 
relations between racial groups, racial inequality, is pervasive and persistent in the 
United States. Compared to whites, African Americans have significantly lower 
incomes and less wealth, have higher mortality and incarceration rates and lower 
educational attainment, and experience poorer health (Bobo & Smith, 1998). For a long 
time, this inequality was justified by dominant scientific and other discourses that 
suggested that African Americans were somehow biologically inferior. Thanks to the 
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Civil Rights movement in America and other struggles, explicit racism has become 
illegal. Few, other than far right extremists, admit to being racist in public. However, 
while greatly diminished, the practice of racism continues, with many whites still 
preferring to maintain social distance from African Americans – though they would not 
admit it is because of racism. While overtly racist discourses have now been 
marginalized, other essentialist and culturally deterministic ones have taken their place, 
arguing that much of these individuals’ social and economic condition is not due to race 
but simply because of lack of hard work or attitude problems. For many, affirmative 
action is seen to only exacerbate this laziness and dependence (Bobo & Smith, 1998). 
As van Dijk (1992) shows, reporting in the media often reinforces such beliefs, 
constructing and then playing to stereotypes. 
Research on gender shows similar patterns. Several scholars have shown 
organizations to be profoundly gendered places to work (Acker, 1990; Gherardi, 1995). 
Calás and Smircich (1993), for example, explain how the management literature 
constructs a masculine image of the leader. Ogbor (2000) and Ahl (2006) show how 
entrepreneurship discourse is similarly gendered. The gendering of the workplace 
continues at least partially due to the texts that describe the workplace and women’s 
role in it. In most of these, women are represented as the only gendered subjects, 
disturbing the smooth running of otherwise gender-free organizations, a problem to be 
fixed (Calás & Smircich, 1993). Similarly, the debate is confined to the capitalist 
paradigm in which a firm must function in particular ways, and our job is simply to 
make it possible for women to play the roles that are available. Sheryl Sandberg’s 
bestselling Lean In (2013) is a case in point. Sandberg’s feminism essentially rests on 
the notion that if women get the same rights as men, the problem is solved. She does 
not see that the gender ‘problem’ is inextricably linked with other issues, such as 
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capitalism, which create certain corporate dynamics and organizational forms. Thus, 
even if privileged white men choose to share the benefits of corporate capitalism with 
privileged white women who ‘lean in’, the systemic inequality does not go away (see 
also Dobbin & Kalev, Chapter 31 this volume). 
These discourses matter because they are instrumental in constructing reality 
(Fairclough, 1992). Management texts, popular books, media reports and television 
programs all shape perceptions of reality (Calás & Smircich, 1993; Hardy, Palmer, & 
Phillips, 2000; Phillips & Hardy, 1997) and the gendered language, concepts and tropes 
that are used act as powerful transmitters of meaning about how an ideal workplace 
should function and who is appropriate for a job. 
The Discourse of Markets and Inequality 
Perhaps the most powerful discourse justifying inequality now is that of the supremacy 
of markets. As we have seen above, even institutionalized practices of gender or race-
based discrimination are increasingly supported by resorting to the fundamental ‘truth’ 
of the market. Gray (2001) similarly suggests that the types of religious doctrines that 
were pervasive more than a hundred years ago have now been replaced for many people 
by those of a more ‘scientific’ persuasion – neoclassical economics. This notion served 
to entrench the myth of ‘free’ markets and justified the consequent concentration of 
wealth. The wealth accumulated by the elites was seen to be legitimately acquired and 
fundamental to the progress of the entire society. Indeed, so powerful was the discourse 
that promoted a neoliberal agenda that any country, or individual, who professed 
anything other than a belief in the primacy of free markets was derided and 
marginalized (Chang, 2011). Discourses portraying the elite as superior in ability and 
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fortitude and as producers of livelihoods for the less fortunate members of society were 
similarly created. 
Inequality is justified by this discourse as being essential to motivating investments 
in human and material capital, rewarding effort and getting talented individuals to fully 
use their abilities. Thus, in a recent issue of The Economist, a magazine known for 
articulating free market arguments, raising the minimum wage was presented as a 
dangerous thing to do for it might end in job losses for the very workers that it purported 
to help. The argument goes back to the productivity incentives logic enshrined in 
neoclassical economics discourse. 
A similarly dominant discourse that informs our understanding of corporate 
governance is agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). This discourse developed not only to explain the longevity of 
corporations despite the self-interested proclivities of managers, but also to justify it. 
This has led to sustained redistribution of profits to shareholders and corporate 
managers leading to concentration of wealth not only across organizations but also 
across geographical locations. The pressure that this system exerts has also led to the 
erosion of labor laws that circumscribed minimum employment conditions, and marked 
increases in inequality (Chang, 2011). 
Corporate devices to further entrench top management and enrich shareholders, 
often at the expense of other stakeholders, have been institutionalized by new 
discourses. For example, Hirsch’s (1986) landmark study of golden parachutes and 
ambushes showed convincingly how discursive strategies aimed at glamorizing 
financial instruments and portraying firms as assets contributed to a transformation of 
practices on Wall Street (see also Collins, 2007). The enrichment of CEOs and 
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shareholders over workers is further sustained by discourses of meritocracy and 
exceptionalism which provide justifications for the elite’s position at the top. Over the 
past three decades, discourses celebrating successful CEOs have led to the 
legitimization of their pay, which according to some, has now reached ‘Marie 
Antoinette proportions’ (Lublin, 1996). 
An important manifestation of the centrality of language to such issues is seen in the 
debate on welfare. From an ideal, a social contract and an aspiration in the 1960s, by 
the 1990s, the term ‘welfare’ had become associated with one of the most unpopular 
social programs in America (Jacoby, 1994), with welfare recipients one of the least 
respected groups (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). This transformation was 
underpinned by discourses that categorized the poor as undeserving (Katz, 1993; Piven 
& Cloward, 1993). 
The powerful free market discourse is so pervasive that it is constantly evoked in 
discussions of gender or race-based inequality too. Serbian tennis champion Novak 
Djokovic’s remarks about women tennis players’ lower wages being a fair reflection of 
their market demand is a good illustration of the intersection of gender and market 
discourses (Guardian, 2016). Djokovic suggested that men should get paid more 
because men’s television ratings are higher than women’s. In other words, whoever is 
able to attract more coverage should get paid more. What he overlooked was that other 
factors are often at work other than popularity. The US women’s soccer team’s World 
Cup victory against Japan in 2015 was the most-watched soccer match in American 
history. Yet on average, American women soccer players earn far less than the male 
players. The salary cap in the National Women’s Soccer League is $265,000, over 13 
times less than the cap in men’s Major League Soccer. 
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Thanks to powerful, deeply entrenched discourses that color reality, empirical 
evidence and impressions are often at odds, be it CEO salaries, proportion of women 
on boards, or the proportion of white males in executive positions. If inequality is to be 
challenged the discourses underpinning these social orders and their taken-for-
grantedness need to be dismantled. 
Understanding how power operates and how discourses assume hegemony is a 
challenge for institutional theorists. While power is always implicit in these analyses, 
with institutional entrepreneurs producing and leveraging discourses to achieve their 
ends (Hirsch, 1986; Munir & Phillips, 2005) the lack of explicit attention to power 
constitutes a noteworthy lacuna (see Lawrence, 2008, for a review). As Willmott (2015) 
suggested, power may occasionally be invoked as a relevant focus or concept of 
analysis (e.g., Zald & Lounsbury, 2010; Lawrence & Buchanan, Chapter 18 this 
volume), but its operation and significance is disassociated from structures of 
domination and oppression. Understanding how discourses perpetuate social inequality 
provides fertile ground for understanding the location and operation of power in an 
institutional setting and is a subject to which institutional theorists can thus make an 
important contribution. 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND INEQUALITY 
[N]ew instruments are needed to regain control over a financial capitalism 
that has run amok. (Piketty, 2014: 474). 
To what extent do we wish to make ours a market-centered world? (Burgin, 
2012: 226) 
The dominant theme in institutional theory in recent years has been the turn to 
institutional logics. An institutional logic refers to ‘a set of material practices and 
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symbolic constructions – which constitutes its organizing principles and which is 
available to organizations and individuals to elaborate’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 
248). As Friedland and Alford (1991) explained, and Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury 
(2012; see also Thornton, 2004) later elaborated, each society contains an inter-
institutional system that is composed of several institutional orders – family, 
community, religion, state, market, profession and corporation2 – that vary in scope and 
prominence across societies. Central to these orders are institutional logics. ‘These 
logics are symbolically grounded, organizationally structured, politically defended, and 
technically and materially constrained, and hence have specific historical limits’ 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991: 249). A logics perspective recognizes that institutions 
cannot be analyzed in isolation from each other but rather that they must be understood 
in their mutually interdependent relationships, even if this implies dealing with 
contradiction and conflict. Extending neo-institutional theorizing (e.g., DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) that emphasized structure over agency, 
the institutional logics perspective seeks to understand how institutions both constrain 
and enable action. More recently, this has been used to show how the socially 
constructed patterns of cultural symbols, beliefs and values shape the dynamics, actions 
and decision outcomes in organizations and across organizational fields (Lounsbury, 
2007; Ocasio, Thornton, & Lounsbury, Chapter 19 this volume). 
While, as a theoretical perspective, the turn to logics has generated significant 
insights on a range of social phenomena, as with other streams within institutional 
theory it has hardly been used to engage with some of the major social issues of our 
time, including the financial crisis, exploitation of workers, corporate power and 
inequality (e.g., Munir, 2011, 2015; Willmott, 2015). In this section, we explain why 
and how institutional logics can offer a potentially revelatory route to uncovering why 
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systems of inequality have become entrenched in our society, and in so doing offer 
useful avenues that interested scholars might profitably pursue. 
Martí and Mair (2009: 100) argued that ‘poverty is multidimensional and its causes 
are rooted in a set of practices, rules, and technologies institutionalized in a determinate 
context’. We suggest that the same is true of inequality. Primarily, this is because logics 
shape what issues are considered problematic, what should be attended to, and thus 
what should be considered during decision-making (Thornton et al., 2012). Recent 
work on institutional logics has pointed to the ways in which institutional fields are 
subject not to simple struggles whereby proponents of one logic are pitted against those 
of another until one group is able to assert its dominance. Rather, decision-makers in 
social settings are subject to more complex arrangements of logic ‘constellations’ 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2011) in which multiple sets of values, beliefs and assumptions 
assume influence from different parts of, and beyond, the field. This has reaffirmed a 
characteristic of ‘old’ institutionalism that emphasized the plural nature of institutions 
(e.g., Kraatz & Block, 2008; Selznick, 1949), something that was often lost as attempts 
focused on the exposition of a struggle for dominance among competing logics. Kraatz 
and Block (2008) developed the idea of institutional pluralism (see also Kraatz & 
Block, Chapter 20 this volume), a theoretical understanding that was elaborated by 
Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and Lounsbury (2011), who contended that 
the degree of ‘institutional complexity’ in a particular field is dependent upon the 
number of salient logics and their degree of incompatibility. This point was taken up 
by Uzo and Mair (2014), who found that organizations in institutionally complex 
settings, including developing countries such as Nigeria, are often born at the interstices 
of formal and informal institutions. In these settings, organizational life and outcomes 
are critically shaped by the incongruence between ‘what the law prescribes as legal and 
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what informal systems of beliefs foresee as socially acceptable’ (Uzo & Mair, 2014: 
57). The impact of this institutional pluralism becomes apparent when we consider the 
working conditions in many developing countries that results in factory owners and 
senior brand managers garnering large sums while those doing the physical work 
frequently operate in dangerous conditions for low rates of pay (e.g., Chamberlain, 
2012; Chan, 2013; Khan, Munir, & Willmott, 2007; Pattisson, 2015). 
Recent work suggests that while societies in many parts of the world are 
characterized by a constellation of competing logics, the dominant logic is often an 
extreme form of capitalism that values the maximization of self-interest and 
accompanying wealth accumulation above anything else. Piketty’s (2014) treatise 
Capital, Danny Dorling’s (2011, 2014) critiques of a society that permits the wealthiest 
1% to continue to accumulate wealth at an increasing rate, and other similar pieces (e.g., 
Chang, 2011; Lansley, 2012; Stiglitz, 2013) make a compelling case for this. Indeed, 
the change in practices at HBOS were reflective of a dominant institutional logic in 
which the maximization of profits, rather than more conservative accrual of capital, 
became taken-for-granted. It also clearly demonstrates the reciprocal interaction 
between micro-processes and field-level logics. While we certainly acknowledge that 
the case for the dominance of such a market logic is undeniable, we contend that an 
examination of the institutional dynamics that have produced such an outcome provides 
useful insights for theorists and policy-makers alike. As Munir (2011) suggests, 
institutional theorists could add great value by exploring how logics shifted from one 
that placed markets within society to one that understands society in terms of markets. 
Society has not always been dominated by a market logic (Biggart & Castanias, 
2001). Pre-capitalist economic thought in the West was deeply influenced by a strong 
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sense of the social and even the religious. Prices did not only have to be ‘right’ but also 
‘just’ and the economy was often envisioned as a moral order. Even when later liberal 
thought, exemplified in the writings of David Hume and Adam Smith, went about 
creating a new moral order from the perspective of the public rather than the monarch, 
institutional relations still had to be ‘correct’ in terms of morality. Further, as Chang 
(2011) contends, if we look historically, those countries that currently are biggest 
proponents for free market systems, such as the US and the UK, benefitted from 
strongly protectionist regimes that they now tout as anathema to modern economies. 
How we moved from systems predicated on government intervention to an institutional 
order where it has become accepted that whatever social order results from market 
forces is ‘just’ (see Burgin, 2012, for a historical exposition of this) is thus an extremely 
important and significant challenge for institutional theorists. 
Despite our point about the apparent predominance of the market logic, it is certainly 
not some form of monolithic hegemony. Even countries that emphasize free market 
economies, such as the United States, Sweden, Germany, Japan and South Korea, have 
variations in the degree and location of government intervention. Further, there are of 
course conflicting logics enacted in countries with different ideological regimes – for 
example, China, Russia, Cuba, North Korea, Greece, Iran and Saudia Arabia. The rise 
of Jeremy Corbyn in the UK and Bernie Sanders in the US as populist socialist 
figureheads also points to the problematizing of market logics. There was also, of 
course, a questioning of market logics in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 global 
financial crisis, even if it has not immediately resulted in any large-scale ideological 
shifts in government philosophies in most major economies around the world. 
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Again, it is important to understand the complexity of institutional logics when it 
comes to understanding the persistence of inequality and the (in)effectiveness of 
measures designed to address it. For example, Martí and Mair (2009: 112) described 
how attempts to engage women in rural Bangladesh in commercial activities involved 
not only, 
juggling financial and business logics … it also requires the entrepreneurial 
actor to navigate subtly between a range of other logics since the provision of 
loans for productive purposes challenges existing cultural and religious norms 
that sanction the seclusion of these women in their houses, the patriarchal 
system, or the gendered division of labor that restricts the involvement of 
women to a very limited range of public activities. 
Building on this line of thought, Venkataraman, Vermeulen, Raaijmakers, and Mair 
(2016) showed how logics can be deployed as strategic resources to alter institutional 
arrangements that underpin deeply entrenched inequality. Studying a development 
project targeting women in rural India, they showed how the simultaneous enactment 
of both community and market logics was critical in the development of new social 
structures – Self-Help Groups – to break existing patterns of dominance and economic 
exclusion. Thus, while we can see the prominence of a market logic, we also need to 
account for the ways in which constellations of logics interact in messy, often 
unanticipated ways. 
There are, of course, other situations in which conflicting logics should draw 
attention from institutional theorists. For example, in the field of Islamic Banking, while 
practices may vary, the system is premised on fairness rather than simply an efficiency 
of capital. Work must be done to accrue profits: simply lending money to someone who 
needs it does not count as work as, under the Islamic banking logic, money must not be 
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allowed to simply create more money. Thus, instead of traditional accounts with set 
interest rates, Islamic banks offer accounts in which the bank uses deposits to purchase 
assets that in turn can generate profits or losses. Similarly, market speculation is 
disallowed. Islamic finance prohibits the selling of something one does not own, since 
that introduces the risk of its unavailability later on. Finally, Islamic finance requires 
that investments are restricted to ethical causes or projects. Anything unethical or 
socially irresponsible, from weapons to gambling to adult entertainment, is considered 
inappropriate for investment. The continued presence of such principles in societies 
dominated by a market logic raises questions such as how and why traditional logics 
based on fairness and principles of justice are resisted and suppressed. 
Below, we discuss two mutually constitutive societal characteristics that have 
resulted in the current dominance of the market logic. The first is the development of 
values and norms that have rendered capital accumulation not only legitimate but 
unquestionably appropriate for a functioning member of society. The second is the 
creation of policies and laws that render any other form of functioning appear irrational 
and difficult to comprehend. We take each of these in turn. 
Inequality, Logics and Society 
Barley (2008, see also Chapter 13 this volume) provides compelling encouragement for 
institutionalists to ‘study social organization in action’. Drawing in particular on the 
Chicago School sociology of Everett Hughes, Barley argued that, ‘institutions are tied 
to ideologies championed by specific segments of society that lend the institution 
legitimacy. As ideologies change, legitimacy will change and, hence, so will the 
institution’ (2008: 497). Scott, Ruef and Caronna (2000) similarly argued that changes 
in institutional logics are accompanied by changes in the structures of field governance. 
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It is our contention that such societal changes in what constitutes legitimate courses of 
action, has led, over time, to an increase in levels of inequality. For example, as has 
been widely reported, many if not most developed economies have been characterized 
by a shift from, among other things, a strong manufacturing base to a reliance on service 
sector jobs. One outcome of this has been, drawing on Barley, a new societal ideology 
with an accepted bifurcation. Leana et al. (2012: 888), building on Craypo and Cormier 
(2000), similarly argued that, as a consequence, ‘many firms are structured like an 
hourglass, characterized by large wage disparities. At the top is a set of highly skilled 
professionals (e.g., doctors, chefs), and at the bottom is a far larger group of frontline 
support staff with fewer qualifications (e.g., nurse aides, waiters) and nowhere to move 
up.’ This has created an accepted reality in which ‘poverty, like culture, provides a 
context with systematic and persistent influences that are substantial to the individuals 
living in it’ (Leana et al., 2012: 891). This points to the revived interest in cultural 
perspectives of inequality (see, for example, Cohen, 2010; Small, Harding, & Lamont, 
2010). This increasingly polarized societal structure is sustained and perpetuated by a 
shared understanding and acceptance of inequality based on a set of widely held beliefs, 
material practices and symbolic constructions. The pervasiveness of inequality is 
reinforced by a strong emphasis on the role of professions and professional workers in 
our society. This runs across the financial industries, including banks, financial traders, 
accounting firms, and so on, with an emphasis on the maximization of financial returns 
for clients, shareholders and senior employees. 
Stinchcombe (1997: 8) argued that the influence of institutions stems from the fact 
that they ‘embody a value that the people also accept.’ Lok (2010) goes further, stating 
that institutional logics not only direct what individuals want or how they should act, 
but indeed who or what they are. In this respect, the pervasiveness of logics becomes 
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apparent. Importantly, while we have argued that there is often a dominant market logic, 
we must be attuned to the fact that inequality creates, and rests upon, different lived 
experiences, and different corresponding logics that are experienced in multiple ways. 
Thus, inequality will condition understanding and action in particular ways that are 
nonsensical to those from different socioeconomic strata. For example, according to 
Gray and Kish-Gephart (2013: 678), 
Members of upper social classes adopt a privileged subject position that 
allows them to assume that, as successful people, they possess ‘the right stuff’ 
and deserve more than others. To hold this view they must develop a rationale 
that justifiably differentiates them from others. 
As Dorling (2014) and other social commentators, such as The Guardian’s Polly 
Toynbee, have described, this allows those in positions of advantage to pursue courses 
of action that reinforce and extend that advantage, irrespective of the outcomes on 
others be they Nepalese construction workers in Qatar (Gibson, 2014), factory workers 
manufacturing Apple products in China (Agence France-Presse, 2014; Chan, 2013) or 
the working poor in the UK (Butler, 2015). In this respect, outcomes are not only the 
result of one group being more powerful than another and thus able to exert its will, but 
also of socially constructed and broadly accepted meanings that are attached to groups 
and actions. This, in turn, accounts for opportunity ‘hoard and exclusion’ practices that 
result in enduring patterns of inequality (Tilly, 1998). Thus, those in different societal 
positions will operate according to different institutional logics. That said, those in 
some groups will not be unaware of the logics that govern others. Indeed, the litany of 
social ills that have been correlated with inequality stem from the realization among 
those who have little that others adhere to a different set of rules and values (Wilkinson 
& Pickett, 2010). 
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Given that institutional logics are social constructions that place a heavy emphasis 
on broadly understood meanings (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Zilber, Chapter 16 this 
volume), and that the degree to which these meanings are accepted determines their 
level of institutionalization, we can see that established understandings of what is 
appropriate – including assumptions that inequality is inevitable and that people are 
wealthy or poor as of right – have an extreme durability. Mutually understood schemas, 
frames and rules structure the sense-making of individuals: ‘the shared nature of these 
cognitive frames makes it difficult to stray far from them in either thought or deed’ 
(Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007: 959). 
Logics and Policy-Making 
In addition to the centrality of institutional logics in our understandings of inequality 
being located within, and a product of, societal norms and expectations, logics also 
come to be embodied in prevailing political and legal structures. These can be at the 
macro governmental level or those that attend to more micro, situation-specific 
contextual imperatives. Not only do they exert a prescriptive effect on what is and is 
not legally acceptable (cf. Scott’s [1995] regulative pillar), they also have a powerful 
symbolic impact on conveying what is legitimate in a particular societal setting. In this 
respect, as institutional scholars have explained, we can see mutually constitutive 
effects across levels, from the individual to the organizational to the field. 
For example, as we have noted earlier, the predominance of the market logic can be 
attributed to the rise of Thatcherism in the UK and Reaganomics in the US (see, among 
others, Lansley, 2012; Levy & Temin, 2007; Stiglitz, 2013; Thompson, 2007). 
Accompanied by the withering away of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall, a 
political ideology took root in the West that favored free-market principles above all 
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else. This led to a number of policies that reduced government intervention in corporate 
activities, and brought in ‘private sector discipline’ to what were viewed as profligate 
public sector agencies. While the effects of these were manifold, one particularly 
important outcome was the so-called big bang in the UK in 1986 that allowed much 
greater operative freedom to financial institutions. Similar shifts in the financial 
services industry also occurred in the US, in particular with the repeal of the Glass–
Stegall Act in 1999 that had separated commercial and investment banking. 
Economic and social theorists have traced the relaxing of these regulative structures 
to the beginning of an increase in inequality (Chang, 2011; Dorling, 2011; Piketty, 
2014; Stiglitz, 2013). To this point, the disparities of the early years of the 20th century 
had been successively overcome by forced redistribution of wealth and controls on top 
wage earners, primarily through taxation. This had seen levels of inequality decrease 
throughout the 20th century. However, from 1980 on, the Republicans in the US and 
the Conservatives in the UK began a policy shift that reflected the prevailing 
institutional logics. These changes led directly to the rapid increase in salaries in the 
financial sector that, it has been contended, have increased levels of inequality (e.g., 
Dorling, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013). While perhaps most obvious in their effect in the US and 
UK, the trend in other wealthy countries, such as Japan, Germany, France and other 
continental European states, ‘is in the same direction’ (Piketty, 2014). This was 
certainly not a one-way street – government policies in the early 1980s reflected large 
swathes of public sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic – as such, we can see policies 
as carriers of logics in that they reinforced a particular ideology. 
While we can document the ways in which macro-level policies are carriers of 
logics, there are more localized effects that can also be powerful in their impact. For 
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example, Barley (2007: 203) described how a decision by Chief Justice Waite in the 
1886 Supreme Court hearing of an initially local property dispute in Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. led to corporations being ‘protected as if they 
were natural persons under the law … and has been subsequently used by U.S. Courts 
to decide cases and grant corporations additional rights.’ By becoming ensconced in 
law, Barley argues that corporate protectionism has worked to the benefit of 
shareholders and owners, but is against the public good. Chang (2011) similarly points 
to how the prioritization of shareholders in various pieces of legislation over the past 
30 years has exacerbated inequality. In contrast to shareholders, who are generally able 
to move their capital to maximum advantage relatively easily, other stakeholders such 
as employees and some suppliers, are much more vulnerable to downturns in corporate 
performance. As we pointed out with the HBOS example, shareholders and senior 
managers have generally recovered their losses caused by the financial crisis, but those 
who have lost jobs, lost homes, or been otherwise negatively impacted, will likely never 
be able to fully recover. Thus, the shift in logics, described by Barley (2007) and 
documented in detail by Burgin (2012), from a protection of the individual worker to a 
prioritization of shareholder interests, has increased levels of inequality. 
Munir (2011: 116) similarly provides an example of how seemingly small policy 
shifts, in this case the creation in 1991 by Goldman Sachs of a food commodity index 
and subsequent deregulation of futures markets, can have large effects on inequality. 
As he explained, ‘investors flocked toward the index, which led first to a gradual 
increase in food prices and then a rapid escalation. Riots broke out across numerous 
countries and the number of “food insecure” crossed a billion.’ Again, we see the effects 
of an evolution in logics as other banks created their own indices, trading increased, 
and US government policy changed, such as dropping the restriction that futures trading 
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in wheat should only be allowed by bona fide hedgers and increasing the number of 
contracts that could be held. 
In sum, therefore, we see how changes in institutional logics over time have reflected 
increasing levels of inequality. As yet, however, we have not had sustained 
investigation by institutional theorists of how different logics emerge over time, why 
market logics have proved so resilient and what the long-term effects of these have been 
for levels of inequality across different countries. 
IDENTITY AND INEQUALITY 
The oppressed will believe the worst about themselves. (Fanon, 1963) 
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their 
social existence that determines their consciousness. (Marx, 1977 [1859]) 
Identity has emerged as a central concept in the social sciences (Anderson, 1991; Butler, 
1990; Gilroy, 1997; Glynn, Chapter 9 this volume). Very simply, it allows us to make 
sense of who is who and adapt our behavior accordingly. This is not to suggest that 
identities are static and fixed in place, or even something we can possess. As Laclau 
and Mouffe (2001) argued, it is only in our social relations that we acquire 'subject 
positions' and such subjective identities are multifaceted. Thus, the same woman might 
be a soldier, an ethnic immigrant, a Muslim, a mother and a wife. Likewise, a man and 
a woman might share the same identity in one context (e.g., members of the American 
elite) but might end up with different ones (man and woman) upon travelling to Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, no identity is inherently privileged and the salience of particular 
identities depends on the social context and the existence of discursive practices that 
make such identities subjectively accessible. 
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Similarly, identity is malleable rather than fixed in time or space. It is thus an 
ongoing project. Among many other things, the construction of a particular identity 
might draw upon actions (e.g., consumerism), biology (skin color), inheritance (wealth 
or class), or membership of a particular category (the communist party). As Gray and 
Kish-Gephart (2013) suggest, all these identities can play important roles in the 
structuring of social and organizational life. For example, who we hire, who rises 
through the ranks, who talks to who, and so on, all have much to do with identity. It is 
not surprising then that in organization studies, identity has also come to assume an 
increasingly important position as an interpretive frame in the analysis of organizations 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Glynn, Chapter 9 this volume; Haslam & Reicher, 2006). As 
Alvesson, Ashcraft and Thomas (2008: 7) suggested, ‘identity research has already 
yielded insight on questions of motivation, individual and group behaviour, 
communication patterns, leadership and managerial work, organizational change, 
corporate image, inter-organizational interaction, dynamics of control and resistance, 
and relations of gender and race-ethnicity.’ Even economists have found identity, 
especially stigmatized identity, to affect performance in organizations (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2005, 2010; Hoff & Pandey, 2006). 
Identity and the Maintenance of Inequality 
While organization and institutional theorists have found identity to be a powerful 
construct, and even recognized how it is implicated in organizational dynamics (Gray 
and Kish-Gephardt, 2013), an aspect of identity that has been little explored in 
organization studies is its role as a key mechanism through which inequalities are 
sustained. Wider literature in sociology and history has linked identity to unequal social 
structures – mainly through discursive, symbolic and performative mechanisms, and it 
is important that institutional theorists recognize this dynamic. 
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The implication of identity in the perpetuation of inequality begins right from 
childhood. Lareau’s (2011) seminal work argued that middle-class and working-class 
families raise their children completely differently, with the former cultivating 
attributes in children that will later help them get ahead in economic and social life, and 
the latter viewing a child’s natural growth as an accomplishment in itself. Similarly, 
Aries and Seider (2005) demonstrated how social class plays an important role both as 
an independent variable that shapes the formation of identity and as a domain of identity 
exploration. Their study of college students reveals how pupils carry different identities 
depending on their socioeconomic class. Similarly, in a study of 5th–12th graders from 
US school districts in an economically depressed area, Alix and Lantz (1973) found 
high occupational aspirations varied positively with socioeconomic status. Other 
studies have confirmed these findings. For example, Cook et al. (1995) found that 
economically advantaged boys disproportionately anticipated that they would become 
doctors or lawyers while those from lower socioeconomic groups more expected to be 
policemen or firemen. 
Particularly interesting here is the work of Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), who 
showed how the lower academic performance of working-class children is explained 
not by lower ability but by institutional biases against them resulting in a situation 
where the class in which one is born ends up determining one’s probability of success 
in life. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) suggested that schools evaluate all children on 
the basis of their cultural capital (familiarity with high-brow culture of the dominant 
class) and penalize lower-class students who lack familiarity with it. Schools value 
extensive vocabularies, wide-reading, knowledge of music and art, and general 
etiquette. Almost always, students from higher social backgrounds acquire these 
resources at home while working-class children have little access to them. Given the 
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proliferation of texts that attribute success and failure to hard work and other personal 
qualities, lower-class children end up blaming themselves for their failure, which in 
turn leads to low performance and confidence wherever they go next. This is what 
Sennett and Cobb (1972) call the ‘hidden injuries of class’, in other words, the low self-
esteem that plagues working-class identity. 
Through ‘symbolic violence’ the dominant classes create meaning, control 
resources, enjoy privilege and status, and successfully hide the power relations that are 
the basis of its force (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Once the lower classes internalize 
the hierarchy of ‘taste’ (Bourdieu, 1984), it becomes relatively easy for the upper class 
to maintain their privileges (Lamont & Molnár, 2002). Despite shared membership of 
a particular category (Tajfel, 1981) this dynamic prevents the lower class from seeing 
systemic oppression and thus from rebelling against this hierarchy in which they are 
consigned to the bottom. It is encouraging that some organizational theorists (e.g., Gray 
& Kish-Gephardt, 2013) are beginning to pay attention to class dynamics in the 
workplace but the role of social class in the production of different identities is still 
underexplored. As Aries and Seider (2005) point out, even in sociological literature 
when class is invoked it is generally done in material terms. More work needs to be 
done on the lived experience of class in organizations. In particular, discussions of 
inequality need to be enriched with insights into how social class position constrains 
decision-making (Aries & Seider, 2005). 
While class is important in understanding the links between institutional identities 
and inequality, distinctions based on gender identities are also produced and sustained 
through discourse, language, symbolism and social performance (see Dobbin & Kalev, 
Chapter 31 this volume). Once formed, such identities severely constrain human 
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behavior, limiting spheres of prescribed action and expectation in organizations. Such 
distinctions are in turn maintained and reinforced by existing inequalities. Thus, as Ely 
(1995) pointed out, an overrepresentation of white men in high-status positions not only 
reinforces the devaluation of women and non-white subordinates but is also found to 
be detrimental to performance outcomes and treatment of women and ethnic minorities. 
Ely also found that compared to women in more gender-balanced firms, women in 
male-dominated firms tended to evaluate women’s attributes less favorably in relation 
to firm requirements for success. Thus, the construction of gender identities does not 
stop after one is socialized in families, schools and through media and culture, but 
continues in work organizations. As Ely’s research shows, proportional representation 
of women in power affects women’s gender identity at work. There are clearly 
opportunities for institutional theorists to provide insight into the ways in which 
organizational forms are related to particular identities. Work that similarly examines 
links with race, disability, sexuality, age and so on would also be highly valued. 
Exploitation and Creation of New Identities 
Thanks to work on ‘total institutions’ we do have some knowledge of how certain 
organizational settings bestow particular identities on people (Wallace, 1971). For 
example, research has revealed how the military offers men unique resources for 
constructing a masculine identity defined by emotional control, physical fitness, self-
discipline, the willingness to use violence and risk-taking. These characteristics are in 
line with the hegemonic ideal present in the wider institutional context (Hinojosa, 
2010). 
On the other hand, in order to survive in ‘total’ institutions, old, complex identities 
formed in the ‘normal’ world need to be covered up. Research on prisons highlights the 
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radical identity changes that ensue there (Berger, 1963). Similarly, the Bank of Scotland 
case revealed how individuals had developed particular identities that were crucially 
compatible with the decisions they made, from being risk-averse, to aggressively 
pursuing merger opportunities, to embracing a strategy of high-pressure selling of new 
products (Perman, 2013). Lipsky’s (2003: 145) four-year ethnography of West Point 
vividly describes the process of identity construction, from how on their first day the 
cadets have to strip down to their underwear, have their hair cut off, put on a uniform 
and address an older cadet with the proper salute and the statement: ‘Sir, New Cadet 
Doe reports to the cadet in the Red Sash for the first time as ordered.’ The new cadets 
must stand and salute and repeat, and stand and salute and repeat, until they get it 
exactly right, all the while being reprimanded for every mistake. This is the beginning 
of the process in which they surrender their old identity and assume a new one. 
Indeed, organizational membership often requires shedding old identities and 
assuming new ones. For instance, Sasson-Levy (2002) highlights how women in 
masculine roles are found to accept the model of hegemonic masculinity and employ a 
series of discursive and bodily practices to shape their identity accordingly. This 
‘identity work’ has been observed in other organizations as well. Gray and Kish-
Gephart (2013) have highlighted how employees carry their class identities into 
organizations, a phenomenon that results in visible identity-based dynamics in 
organizational life. Members of upper and lower classes experience and make sense of 
organizational life differently. For example, concerned about ‘symbolic threats’ to their 
identity in organizations, members of lower classes will often try to obscure their own 
class background, or devise coping strategies such as referring to middle and upper 
classes as incompetent but lucky. In this way, they counteract their own fear of 
denigration and negative evaluation by elites (Gray & Kish-Gephart, 2013). 
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At a societal level, identities are also created by the dominant classes to extend and 
legitimize their domination. The work on colonialism, for example, is particularly 
instructive in this regard. To justify the colonization of a people, images are often 
created so that the subjugation makes sense. These images become the identity of the 
colonized. Amongst various things that the colonized come to believe are that they are 
lazy, backward and unimaginative. Such images become excuses for the colonial 
situation, with the white man’s burden seeming a legitimate one. Such myths valorize 
the colonizers and humble those who are colonized. Meager wages for the colonized, 
lower privileges and a life of subordination are all justified through such discursive 
means. 
These literatures highlight how colonization creates and is sustained by the creation 
of identities of both the colonized and the colonizer (Said, 1977). The colonized develop 
negative identities – coming to see themselves as lesser beings who do not deserve more 
resources or increased participation in societal affairs (Fanon, 1963). Such identities 
enable the colonial apparatus to go largely unchallenged, and are a result of affective 
behavioral, cognitive, linguistic and cultural mechanisms designed to solidify political 
domination (Prilleltensky & Gonick, 1996). 
Other Mechanisms of Reinforcement of Inequality 
Socialization and domination both require creation of identities, but there are other 
mechanisms for reinforcement and transmission of inequality too. The two that 
institutional theorists will be most familiar with are myth and ceremony (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). 
Elites cultivate identities that allow them to sustain and legitimize their privileged 
position in organizations. The dominant discourse of meritocracy allows elites to reject 
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the notion that ‘the game is rigged’ (Schwalbe, 2008). By invoking the meritocracy 
argument, which suggests that top management positions, fame and fortune are all 
‘earned’ through hard work and cleverness, elites legitimize their identities. They rely 
on ‘autobiographical reasoning’ (Scully & Blake-Beard, 2006: 436) to project onto 
everyone their own experience of success, which they attribute to individual effort and 
ability, assuming that others’ circumstances and capabilities are similar to their own. 
Rituals play a key role in how the elites come to internalize their identities. 
Privileged and non-privileged positions are of course in part a result of societal logics 
that cultivate particular identities. For instance, in their study of formal dining at 
Cambridge University, Dacin et al. (2010) point out how the production of particular 
identities in organizations is central to the perpetuation of unequal social structures that 
allow privileged groups to maintain their positions at the top. They argue that rituals 
socialize participants into particular norms and values and teach them the roles they are 
expected to play. The ritual of college dining historically reflected the British class 
system in the sense that Fellows and students were drawn almost exclusively from its 
upper reaches and served by waiters and butlers whose primary objective was to protect 
the privilege of the former. Participants were therefore familiar with the performance 
and how to enact its main aspects before their arrival at Cambridge. Moreover, they 
essentially took for granted the notion of a class structure and their place in it. More 
recently, however, as the social backgrounds of participants became increasingly 
diverse, the purpose of the ritual changed: it now subtly socialized the participants into 
adopting the sensibilities that made the elite distinct. In particular, it legitimated social 
stratification and an explicit categorization of people according to rank and station. In 
short, it endorsed and reified the concepts that lay at the core of the class system. In this 
 49 
sense, organizational rituals were seen to produce and maintain identities that sustained 
wider inequalities. 
Identity and Agency 
In addition to being a device for categorization and legitimization, as we lay out above, 
identity can also serve as a mechanism for challenging existing classification systems. 
Indeed, the assumption of new identities at a collective level is often a hallmark of 
revolutionary and social movements aimed at reducing inequality. Discourses creating 
and emphasizing particular collective identities aimed at ending the domination of the 
elites may become contentious. An example is Margaret Thatcher’s aversion to the 
usage of the term ‘class’ – she preferred the terms ‘individual’ or ‘family’, viewing 
class as a ‘divisive’ term. Such distinctions may also be observed in organization 
theory, with labor process theorists preferring to use the term ‘labor’ where others 
would have used ‘employees’ or ‘human resources’ (Braverman, 2003). In short, 
assumptions about and consciousness of particular identities can serve to sustain or 
destabilize existing relations of inequality. Identity then is a crucial and understudied 
construct in understanding the creation, perpetuation and destabilization of unequal 
social orders. Institutional theorists are ideally poised to study the creation of particular 
identities and their implication in the maintenance of particular social orders. This 
requires a heightened sensitivity to the maintenance of unequal power relations 
underpinning particular institutional orders (Munir, 2015) and the factors constraining 
the agency of the oppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Inequality has increased dramatically since 1980, with the ability of those with the most 
wealth to continue to capture more of it, at the expense of those with significantly less, 
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being remarkable (Oxfam, 2016, 2017; Piketty, 2014; Saez & Zucman, 2014). 
Accompanying this rise in inequality has been a growing amount of commentary, 
predominantly from economists and sociologists, into the levels of inequality and the 
associated consequences for various groups in our societies. Organization theorists in 
general, and institutional theorists in particular, by contrast, have been largely absent 
from these debates. Thus, our purpose in this chapter has been to uncover where, and 
how, institutional theorists might effectively contribute to our understanding of 
inequality. In this concluding section, we offer a brief recapitulation of our theorizing 
and make suggestions as to where institutionalists might direct their lines of inquiry. 
We have focused our attention on four strands of the institutional literature that have 
particular promise in opening up new understandings of why inequality has become so 
entrenched in society. The first of these involves examining the institutional 
microfoundations of inequality. Inequality is enacted and experienced through the 
everyday, often mundane, unquestioned activities of individual actors. These activities 
become routine and taken-for-granted over time through processes of habitualization 
and legitimization. As yet, however, we have little understanding of how these 
processes take place, and in particular how they impact inequality. We therefore feel 
that there are several questions that could be profitably addressed. First, it would be 
useful to know how elites are able to draw on existing power arrangements to reproduce 
practices that maintain their positions of advantage over others in society. Second, what 
forms of institutional work are engaged in by those in different strata in society – both 
deliberately and inadvertently – that reinforce inequality? A third useful point of 
investigation would be into how the structures and practices within organizations 
resulting in hierarchical divisions become reinforced and taken-for-granted. 
 51 
Our second conceptual area of focus draws attention to the ways in which discourse 
helps reinforce societal divisions. Our central contention here is that inequality is not 
maintained by brute force, but rather requires continuous legitimization through the use 
of an interrelated system of discourses that collectively justify a particular social order. 
However, as yet we have little understanding of how discourses are deployed by 
powerful stakeholders to maintain their power. Thus, a useful first point of inquiry 
would be to map over time the ways by which different discourses are constructed and 
invoked to maintain intra and inter-organizational inequality. Second, institutional 
theorists could assume a more critical perspective and question the market-based 
paradigm that dominates most aspects of our society. This is important because there is 
an increasingly clear relationship between market-based exchanges and the creation of 
inequality. For example, the ways in which markets have been imposed on public sector 
organizations has been a notable feature of government policies in several countries 
over the last four decades. Understanding the discourses that are implicated in such 
transference would undoubtedly be a valuable addition to our understanding of 
inequality. A third line of investigation could be to uncover the ways in which power 
is used in the construction of, and becomes manifest through, different discourses in 
ways that retain systems of advantage and disadvantage. 
Institutional logics, our third focal point, has become important in helping uncover 
how ways of thinking, decision-making and behaving combine to create courses of 
action that are not only viewed as the ‘obvious’ way to proceed, but that also establish 
others as illegitimate if not unthinkable. This, of course, is particularly important when 
we think about how the day-to-day activities that we described in the first section, and 
the discourse discussed in the second section, help reify structures of inequality. While 
there has been much discussion about how logics help determine particular courses of 
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action, there has been virtually no explicit attention given to the links between 
institutional logics and inequality. There are several avenues of potentially valuable 
research that are open to exploration. First, investigation of the emergence of different 
logics and their corresponding connection to societal inequalities would be particularly 
useful. The rise, and dominance, of market logics is perhaps the most obvious starting 
point here, though there are other kinds of logics that also demand attention for the 
ways in which they pervade organizational life and exacerbate inequality. Second, the 
processes by which policies in private, public and non-profit organizations are 
developed such that they not only reflect dominant societal logics, but also act as 
carriers of them, is also a theoretically important question into which we as yet have 
little insight. Third, the ways in which certain logics in complex fields become more or 
less influential over time is ill-understood: research in this area should thus have great 
potential for advancing not only our understanding of inequality, but institutional 
change processes more generally. 
In the fourth theoretical component of the chapter, we demonstrate how the 
construction and legitimization of particular identities is inherently linked to unequal 
social structures. From class dynamics in the workplace through to distinctions based 
on gender, race, age, sexuality, disability and so on, it is clear that identity plays heavily 
into the processes through which inequalities are legitimized. Again, this leads to 
several potential areas by which institutional theorists can contribute to our 
understanding of inequality. First, it would be immensely useful if we could better 
understand the ways in which identities become ensconced from early childhood 
through the activities of institutions such as families, schools, universities – including 
business schools – and local communities. Second, the role of organizations in 
bestowing identities on particular stakeholders in ways that privilege some groups over 
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others is not well understood and thus warrants attention. Third, while much work has 
viewed identity as stable and monolithic, there is undoubtedly the potential for 
flexibility and some level of malleability, so it is certainly possible that identity could 
be a mechanism for challenging existing systems of inequality. Again, this is a dynamic 
of which we have, as yet, little understanding. 
As laid out above, each of the four areas upon which we have focused offers insights 
into inequality, and the potential for further fruitful lines of research. Moreover, as our 
institutional interpretations are made explicit, the policy implications should follow. In 
this respect, institutionalists are well positioned to make purposeful practical, as well 
as theoretical, interventions, something previously the preserve of other social 
scientists. It is also worth pointing out that, while we treat each of the four institutional 
topics in isolation, much as they have been developed in the literature, how they might 
be used in combination demands attention. While all four offer the potential to examine 
the antecedents and outcomes of inequality at different levels, from individual to 
societal, each tends to preference one level over another: logics, for example, have been 
considered more macro while microfoundations are, unsurprisingly, more micro in 
orientation. Similarly, we might find that discourse is consumed and interpreted 
individually in some settings whereas identity is collectively enacted. Adopting a multi-
perspective approach has, therefore, much potential. Whether singly or in combination, 
it is apparent that each of these aspects of institutionalism has much to contribute to our 
understanding of inequality. We hope that this chapter proves to be useful in providing 
impetus to such much-needed research. 
NOTES 
1. Our thanks to editors Royston Greenwood and Tom Lawrence, along with David Cooper and 
Maureen Scully, for their encouragement and astute comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Thanks 
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also to the participants of sub-theme 16 at EGOS 2012 and sub-theme 24 at EGOS 2015, and those 
who attended the 2013 ‘Inequality, Institutions and Organizations’ conference in Vancouver for their 
inspiration and insights. 
2. From Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012). 
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